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ABSTRACT
We discuss specification of regression models for using migration data to infer the living
standards of different regions, and for observing how much of the standard of living is
determined by economic opportunities versus non-pecuniary amenities.  We estimate a regression
using Canadian data from 1976-95, which results in rankings of the provinces with respect to
overall living standards and amenities, with different rankings for different age groups.  The
regression also uncovers some interesting evidence as to the existence of equilibrium.   
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Regression Methods for Estimating Relative Quality of Life
Voluntary migration is the way people express their hope and desire for a better life.  People
choose to move because they think that the move will make them wealthier, more comfortable,
more stimulated, happier.  Social scientists have long sought to understand what conditions of
society will make people happier; some would say it is our primary mission.  Nearly everyone
wants to be wealthy, comfortable, and secure, but what else do human beings seek from their
environment?  Every act of migration emphatically expresses the migrant’s preferences, at
considerable cost to the migrant.  Aggregate migration data therefore contain trustworthy
information about the aggregate tendency of human preferences, if we can learn to read it
correctly.
Available migration data provide some sketchy facts: the number of people who move, the
places they move from and to, a few characteristics of those places, perhaps a few facts about the
migrants themselves.  We don't know much about each person's decision to move, so we model
the decision as a random event, as though migrants choose their destination with a throw of the
dice.  The dice are “loaded,” however, in favor of destinations that offer desirable amenities and
economic opportunity.  If we can deduce the probabilities of moving to each possible location we
can compare the attractiveness of those locations.  By subtracting out the component explained by
economic opportunity, we can measure the value of non-pecuniary amenities, such as weather,
culture, scenery, and recreational opportunities.
In this paper, we briefly review and then apply recent advances in the theory and practice of
migration hedonics and measurement to obtain a refined measure of the relative levels of living
standards offered in different regions.  Using information about the probability of migration flows
between pairs of provinces (cross-migration data) combined with income measurements, we
apply regression techniques to identify the portion of those flows that is correlated with income
opportunities.  This technique allows us to rank provinces in terms of their non-pecuniary
amenities, and to express the value of those amenities in terms of their income value, or
compensating differential.  Stratification of the migration data by age allows us some insight as to
the evolution of preferences over the life cycle.
I. Inferring Living Standards from Migration Flows
There is a long tradition of theoretical papers attempting to understand the relationship
between amenities and migration, and empirical papers attempting to infer relative attractiveness2
of locations from migration patterns.  In the economics literature (as opposed to geography or
regional science) Tiebout (1956) is the seminal paper.  Tiebout’s model depicts a self-sorting
process of diverse consumers who vote with their feet, migrating to the community that offers the
package of amenities that best suits them as individuals.  Rosen (1979), on the other hand, de-
emphasizes the sorting process, assuming that people have a common basis for assessing the
standard of living.  In Rosen’s model, migration attracted by high-amenity locations both
increases rents and decreases wages, and hence is self-limiting.  In equilibrium (defined as “a
stable distribution of households across cities”) the difference in amenity values among locations
just offsets differences in wages and rents, implying uniform standard of living (SOL) across
locations.  Following Rosen, several authors (e.g., Roback, 1982 and 1988; Hoehn, Blomquist,
and Berger, 1987; and Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn, 1988) have tried to impute relative regional
quality of life from relative real wages, assuming equilibrium in Rosen’s sense.
Other scholars allow for the persistence of disequilibrium, at least in the short run, and use
migration flows to measure the intensity of SOL differences.  Tobler (1979), Constantine and
Gower (1982), Greenwood, Hunt et al. (1991), and Mueser and Graves (1995), among others, use
net migration flows to model attractiveness of a location.  Feeney (1973), Mueser (1989), and
Porell (1982), among others, use gross migration flows to indicate SOL differences.  Ben-Akiva
and Watanatada (1981) provide a choice-theoretic model of the individual’s decision to migrate,
showing how it fits into the framework of McFadden’s multinomial logit model.  Douglas (1997)
discusses how to link this choice-theoretic model to aggregate data.
This paper builds upon Douglas and Wall (1993) and Douglas (1997), which argue that
cross-migration rates provide the richest and most reliable source of data on the relative
attractiveness of different locations.  Douglas (1997) developed an appropriate measure, and
estimated rankings of the U.S. states for 1980 and 1990.  The patterns observed in these rankings
suggest that the opportunity to increase income strongly affects migration, but Douglas (1997)
stops short of applying regression techniques to measure the influence of income.
The central concept in the Douglas/Wall model is that the standard of living (SOL)1 of a
possible destination, relative to a person’s current residence, is the prime determinant of the
                                                     
1  We will use the term “Standard of Living” (SOL) to refer to the overall attractiveness of a location,
including economic opportunity.  The term “quality of life” (QOL) refers in this paper to the non-
pecuniary aspect of the attractiveness of a location; technically, it is the component of SOL that is
orthogonal to income.3
probability that the person will move to that location. Thus, holding other things (such as the
attractiveness of other locations) constant
   [SOLWelsford, NB - SOLJoe Smith in NS]  µ  Pr{Joe Smith in NS moves to Welsford, NB}        (1.1)
where “µ” means “is proportional to”; Joe Smith is an Nova Scotian, and Welsford is a town in
New Brunswick.
Equation (1.1) is specific to Joe Smith’s decision about moving to Welsford.  Generalizing
(1.1) so as to compare the overall standards of living in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia will
require some assumptions about the relationship of Joe to other Nova Scotians, and of Welsford
to the rest of New Brunswick.  In the extreme, if Nova Scotia were full of Joe Smith clones and
all New Brunswick locations were just like Welsford (and no other provinces existed) we would
only need to watch Joe and see if he moves to New Brunswick.  If he moves, then New
Brunswick’s SOL is sufficiently higher than Nova Scotia’s to overcome Joe’s inertia; if he
doesn’t, it isn’t.  Fortunately, we have aggregate data on migration between Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick, so the empirical work will not depend on such a strong assumption about how typical
Joe or Welsford is.  Rather, the validity of the empirical work will depend on the existence of a
universal, well-defined central tendency to human preferences, a general consensus that manifests
in what we call “the” standard of living SOL.  Equation (1.1) expresses the essential relationship
between migration and relative SOL, and so we construct our aggregate measure of SOL from
equation (1.1).
Construction of the aggregate measure follows the development in Douglas (1997).
Assuming sufficient regularity of preferences and of pre-migration SOL among the residents of
Nova Scotia, (and a sufficiently large population of Nova Scotia so that the law of large numbers
applies), we can multiply the numerator and denominator of the right hand side of (1.1) by the
number of Nova Scotians to obtain:
[SOLWelsford,NB - SOLNS]  µ  
#Nova Scotians who move to Welsford, NB
#Nova Scotians         (1.2)
where “#” means “number of,” and SOLNS means the standard of living available to a typical
resident of Nova Scotia.  Assuming sufficient uniformity, or at least a well-defined central
tendency, of alternative destination locations in New Brunswick (and a sufficiently large number
of New Brunswick locations), we can multiply the numerator and denominator of the right hand
side of (1.2) by the number of locations in New Brunswick to obtain
   [SOLNB - SOLNS]   µ  
#Nova Scotians who move to NB
#Nova Scotians ´ # Locations in NB .             (1.3)4
The number of locations available in New Brunswick is, in equilibrium, proportional to the
population of New Brunswick (for an explanation of this point see Douglas 1997, Plane 1993,
and Feeney 1973); therefore,
          [SOLNS - SOLNB]   µ  
#Nova Scotians who move to NB
#Nova Scotians ´ #New Brunswickers ,       (1.4)
which is a fully observable measure.  Furthermore, by symmetry
 [SOLNB - SOLNS]  µ  
#New Brunswickers who move to NS
#Nova Scotians ´ #New Brunswickers .          (2)
Because (1.4) and (2) independently express the same SOL differential, it seems reasonable
to combine them.  Furthermore, we can reduce or eliminate much of the noise contained in
expressions (1.4) and (2) by looking at the net flow.  Subtracting (2) from (1.4) and linearizing
yields
[SOLNS-SOLNB] = KNB,NS
#New Brunswickers who move to NS - #Nova Scotians who move to NB
#New Brunswickers ´ #Nova Scotians  
+ RNB,NS
where KNB,NS is a constant, and RNB,NS is a Taylor series remainder, attributable mostly to
asymmetries in moving costs and sensitivity to SOL in alternative provinces (see Douglas 1997,
appendix).
In general, therefore, the cross-migration measure
                                m ^
AB º 
#Migrants from A to B - #Migrants from B to A
POPA ´ POPB
       (3)
can be calculated between any provinces A and B.  Consequently,
m ^
AB = [SOLB - SOLA - RAB
 ] / KAB,
yields a mathematical relationship between population flows and SOL difference.  Ignoring RAB
as small and assuming KAB to be constant across province-pairs,
m ^
AB » SOLB - SOLA
which establishes the desired equivalence between relative SOL and the measurable m ^
AB.
How much of the SOL difference, m ^
AB, arises from differences in income, and how much
arises from differences in QOL, (i.e., amenities uncorrelated with income)?  Previous researchers
have attempted to identify these two components of locational attractiveness using regression
methods.  Greenwood et al. (1991) used net migration data to estimate a regression of the form5
m  -
A = lA + g ln
è ç æ
ø ÷ ö YA
 Y
-  + e
where m  -
A is the net in-migration to province A from all provinces as a percentage of A’s
population, Y
-
 is national average per capita income, and YA is per capita income for province A.2
Many others have estimated similar regressions, with different versions of the dependent variable.
Porell (1982), for example, added a long list of variables such as weather that measure the
amenities offered by each locale, and calculated the income equivalent dollar value of each.
Unlike the dependent variable in these previous studies, the pairwise cross-migration
measure m ^
AB is derived from explicit assumptions about the relationship between interprovincial
migration flow and relative SOL.  Given this methodological advance, we use the more refined
measure m ^
AB to estimate a similar regression equation:
m ^




 YA   + e         (4)
where lA and lB are the QOL in provinces A and B.  Given the estimated QOL vector
l ^ º [l ^
A, l ^
B , . . . l ^
Z]’ and the marginal utility of income g ^, we solve for the income vector Y * that
would equilibrate SOL across all provinces.
II. Data and Estimation
The data set consists of migration flows among the 10 Canadian provinces each year for
twenty years, 1976-95, and per capita personal income for each province for each year.
Migration data are from the Total Migration Series from Statistics Canada, as calculated from
census figures and Family Allowance accounts.  These data are evaluated by Vanderkamp and
Grant (1988).  The migration numbers are broken down into five age groups:  0-17 years of age,
18-24, 25-44, 45-64, and 65+.  However, because results for the people less than 18 years old are
essentially identical to those for their parents in the 25-44 age group, we do not report them here.
Real per capita income is calculated from income and provincial price index data provided by
Statistics Canada.3  There is one observation per year per unique pair of provinces, for a total of
Tn(n-1)/2=900 observations.
                                                     
2  The dependent variable in Greenwood et al. (1991) is equivalent to m ^
AB in (3), but with the cross-
migration defined as between province A and a region called “everywhere else.”   It requires stronger
regularity assumptions, such as global transitivity of province preferences and that all provinces are
small so that “everywhere else” is the same for everyone, and it uses less sample information than the
pairwise cross-migration measure m ^
AB.
3 Hausman tests do not reject the null hypothesis that income is exogenous.6
Each observation contains the net cross-migration flow m ^
ABt for year t, calculated according
to equation (3) from the cross-flows between A and B and their populations.  It also contains the





  1 if j =B
 -1 if j =A
  0 otherwise
That is, djt is equal to –1  if the dependent variable m ^
ABt is the net outflow from province j to B,
equal to 1 if m ^
ABt is the net inflow measure from province A to j, and zero if j is neither A nor B.
(Note that each discrete variable djt is equal to one or minus one in (n-1) observations every year,
and equal to zero for the other (n-1)(n-2)/2 observations for that year.)  The coefficient of the
discrete variable djt is therefore the fixed effect attributable to province j, and can be interpreted
as the estimated relative QOL l ^
j in province j.
It is probably unreasonable to expect relative QOL to be constant over the entire period
1976-95, so we allow the QOL coefficients li to change periodically.  We accomplish this by
subdividing the twenty-year period into t sub-periods, and estimating a different set of l ^’s for
each sub-period.  We ran regressions using t = 1, 2, 4, 5, and 10 (all of which are divisors of 20,
so as to use all observations).  The value of t determines how often l ^ changes, ranging from
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 l js = 0,
one for each period s = 1, . . . t, and estimate using restricted least squares.  The resulting set of
10t quality-of-life estimates l ^
js, can be interpreted as the deviation, during period s, of the QOL
in province j from the national average.
To choose a value of t, we used the Akaike Information Criterion and Amemiya’s Prediction
Criterion, since allowing l to vary more often through time is tantamount to adding time dummy
variables.  Tests based on these criteria in general indicate that perceived relative QOL in
Canadian provinces is quite volatile for younger groups, and becomes markedly less so as the7
population ages.  Specifically, for age groups 0-17, 18-24, and 25-44 the criteria favor the model
in which QOL stays constant for 2-year blocks (t=10), though the 5-year block model (t = 4)
fares nearly as well.  For older groups, however, the 2-year change model (t=10) performs the
worst, which indicates more stable preferences for those over 45.  Migration patterns of 45-64
year olds indicate constant relative QOL for 4-year or 5-year blocks, while 5-year and 10-year
blocks provide the best fit for the oldest group (age 65+).  Because 5-year blocks (t = 4) perform
well across age groups, for uniformity the empirical results reported below concentrate on model
(5) with t=4, with some reference to other results where pertinent.
Using equation (5), the predicted standard of living in province A in year t (which falls
within time block s), relative to the mean SOL for all provinces in time block s, is
SOLAt - 
—
SOLs  = l ^
As + g ^ ln
è ç æ
ø ÷ ö YAt
Y
-
t  .          (6)
To obtain the compensating differential for province A relative to the national average in
year t, set the left-hand-side of (6) equal to zero and solve for relative income
RY
*
At  = ln(YAt /Y
-
t )* = - l ^
As 
 /  g ^;          (7)
which is province A’s compensating differential in terms of percentage difference from the
average.4  By the same token, the “actual differential” income measure
RYAt = ln(YAt /Y
-
t )         (8)
is the percentage difference of province A’s actual per capita income from the national average.
A necessary condition for equilibrium is that the compensating differential equal the actual
differential, RY* = RY for all provinces.
III. Empirical Results
The coefficient estimates from estimation of equation (5), and the associated compensating
differentials calculated from those estimates, appear in tables 1a and 1b.  Note that the income
coefficient g ^ (restricted to remain constant throughout the full 20-year time period), appears at the
bottom of the column below the QOL estimates l ^.  A positive l ^
is indicates that the utility-value
of province i's amenities (i.e., its QOL) in period s exceeds the national average (normalized to
zero); a negative l ^
is indicates below-average QOL.  The t statistics in the second column indicate
whether or not the difference is statistically significant.  The third column of Table 1 contains the
                                                     
4 Using  the  approximation  Dln(x) » %D x.  8
actual differential RY calculated from equation (8).  The compensating differential RY*
calculated from equation (7) appears in the fourth column, and the fifth column contains its
standard error calculated from a linearization of equation (7).
Tables 1a and 1b show that the influence of per capita income on perceived SOL, g ^,  is
positive and significant for all working-age groups.  However, there is a marked variation over
the life cycle.  Most dramatically, g ^ declines monotonically with age, remaining positive and
significant but declining in value to zero for the over-65 age group.  This makes sense, as retirees
generally acquire most of their income from savings, and hence their standard of living does not
depend on the general income level within a province.  It also suggests that the value of g ^ is
determined principally by earned money income, rather than the effect of missing variables that
are positively correlated with income, such as provincial and municipal parks, landscaping
programs, sewer systems, highways.  As the importance of provincial income in the individual’s
utility function declines to zero, the very concept of compensating differential becomes poorly
defined, which explains the enormous std(RY*) for retirees.
Tables 1a and 1b also indicate that as the explanatory power of income declines with age, so
does the overall explanatory power of the regression, as R2 declines from a respectable .36 for 18-
24 year olds to .15 for retirees.  A high R2 means that migration decisions are well explained by
fixed amenity differences among the provinces and economic opportunity; conversely, a low R2
indicates that migration is driven primarily by individual-specific factors such as family and job
tenure.  It makes sense that R2 should decline with increasing age, since individual-specific
factors intensify through the life-cycle as people accumulate location-specific human capital in
family, job, and community relationships over time.
As mentioned above, much of the SOL literature has started with the assumption that the
system of regions is continuously in equilibrium in Rosen’s sense.  Other authors have assumed
that the system is usually out of equilibrium.  (The validity of the estimators that we use in this
paper depends on the assumption that the system is near, but not quite at, equilibrium.)  There are
few tests in the literature, however, for the validity of this assumption.  Douglas (1997) derived
two tests for the existence of equilibrium based on rank correlation statistics, finding that the U.S.
was substantially out of equilibrium during the period 1975-80.
We use a slightly different approach in this paper.  Equilibrium in Rosen’s sense occurs only
if each province’s actual income differential RY equals its compensating differential RY*.
Disequilibrium might occur when an economic, amenity, or preference shock occurs in the9
presence of migrational impediments or friction.  There are many sources of friction in the
migration system, including moving costs, poor information flows about opportunities, and
location-specific human capital such as friendships, knowledge about school systems, business
relationships, and so on.  The more friction, the farther the system may stray from equilibrium
and the lower the correlation between RY and RY*.
The cross-sectional sample correlation coefficient between RY and RY*, reported in table 2,
measures the extent to which equilibrium in Rosen’s sense exists at different times and for the
different age groups.  Correlations are generally high, which supports the assumption that the
system is near equilibrium throughout the period and across age groups.  The relatively low
correlations shown for 1975-80 in table 2, however, suggest that the disequilibrium in the U.S.
observed by Douglas (1997) during that period of high energy prices, economic dislocation, and
inflation, affected Canada as well.
Presumably younger people have accumulated the least migrational friction, so one might
expect the highest correlation between RY and RY* to appear in this age group.  This expectation
is supported by the high correlations shown in table 2 for young adults, age 25-44.  On the other
hand, the 18-24 age group’s correlations are quite volatile, perhaps because many in this age
bracket are in school, many have not yet settled in earnest into the pursuit of income, and the
distinct youth culture may give rise to its own set of rapidly changing preference criteria for
QOL.  The 45-64 age bracket, entrenched in the community and heavily encumbered (or fortified,
depending on how you look at it) with location-specific human capital, shows lower correlations
and hence greater evidence of disequilibrium.  The elderly appear to be the farthest from
equilibrium, again probably because the average income level does not affect them much.
Table 3 explores the question of equilibrium from another angle, summarizing the outcome
of t tests on the null hypothesis H0: RY = RY*, which is a necessary condition for equilibrium.
These tests used the standard error and relative income data from table 1a and 1b, at a 5%
significance level.  Table 4 addresses the same issue in more detail, showing which provinces
accepted and rejected the null in the columns labeled Y-Y*.  In these columns, a negative one
indicates insufficient income (RY<RY*), a positive one indicates more than sufficient income
(RY>RY*), and a zero indicates the null was not rejected (RY=RY*).  (Note that the null was never
rejected for the 65+ age group, not because they were necessarily in equilibrium, but because that
age group’s low value of g ^ rendered the compensating differential estimates meaningless, and
inflated the standard error estimates.)  Columns in table 4 labeled l ^ indicate whether or not10
amenities differed from the national average (based on a t test of H0: l=0), and columns labeled
Y-Y
-
 indicate whether or not income exceeded the average.
Consistent with the previous observations, tables 3 and 4 indicate that the system was
farthest from equilibrium in 1976-80, when H0 was rejected for all but three provinces for the 18-
24 and 25-44 age groups, and all but four provinces for 45-64 year olds.  In most of these cases,
actual income is lower than the equilibrium level (RY<RY*), but in two cases (BC and ALB)
actual income was in fact higher.  In those years, in fact, Alberta boasted above average levels of
both income and QOL for 18-44 year olds, and British Columbia offered the same pair of
advantages to those 45 years of age and over.  By 1985, however, the system was nearer to
equilibrium, with RY=RY* for seven or eight provinces for each age bracket.
In general, in tables 3 and 4 the 18-24 year old group rejects the null most often, while the
25-44’s have the fewest rejections, and hence appear to have been nearest equilibrium of the age
cohorts.  There are relatively few cases in which the overall SOL is significantly above average,
RY>RY*, but British Columbia is consistently above average, and Nova Scotia and Alberta are
also quite good.  Of these, Nova Scotia is especially impressive because it achieves high levels of
SOL in spite of a relatively low income level.  British Columbia’s high SOL, on the other hand,
appears to be the result of a high income level rather than a high QOL.
Table 5 highlights QOL comparisons among the provinces by ranking them according to
their estimated QOL l ^ from table 1.  Although the rankings are generally inconsistent from
period to period, Prince Edward Island (PEI) and Nova Scotia (NS) are generally perceived as
high-amenity locations, whereas Quebec (QUE) and especially Ontario (ONT) consistently rank
at or near the bottom.  The table also highlights a generation gap in QOL, as the oldest age
group’s perception of relative QOL diverges sharply from the mainstream.  The retirees rank
British Columbia, Alberta, and Nova Scotia very highly, while ranking the central provinces of
Manitoba and especially Saskatchewan very low, although they like Ontario better than the other
cohorts do.  The 18-24 age group sends Alberta (ALB) from the top of the ranking in the late
seventies to the bottom in the early eighties, while the 65+ group improved its perception of
Alberta from middle to high-ranking over the same period.
The generation gap is much smaller (or at least the eldest group is no longer a consistent
outlier) in table 6, which ranks provinces according to the standard of living, SOL.  In general,
the SOL rankings of all groups are similar to the elders’ QOL rankings.  (This result may indicate
that a lack of good income data for the elderly, rather than a lack of responsiveness to income-11
correlated amenities, is the reason for explains the low g ^ for the 65+ group.)  Except for a lapse
among the younger cohorts in 1981-5, British Columbia ranks the best across age groups and time
periods, although Nova Scotia also consistently ranks well.  Alberta also has a high perceived
SOL, especially among the youngest and oldest cohorts.  Low income levels reduce the SOL
rankings of the maritime provinces (other than Nova Scotia) below their QOL rankings.
Newfoundland’s position at the very bottom of the SOL rankings is challenged only by the
central plains provinces of Saskatchewan and Manitoba.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
The standard of living varies across regions because the levels of income and amenities
varies.  As utility-maximizing agents optimally locate, incomes adjust and standards of living
equalize, but not without friction.  In equilibrium, all regions have the same standard of living,
which means that in equilibrium the inverse of a region's relative income measures the relative
value of amenities accurately.  However, because incomes, amenities, and preferences change,
and frictions prevent standard-of-living equivalence from occurring at every point in time, actual
relative income is often not an accurate indicator of amenity levels.
This paper discusses the design of a regression to identify the income and amenity (QOL)
components of the standard of living (SOL).  We conclude that the best measure of relative SOL
levels is the net cross-migration flow rate between pairs of provinces m ^
AB, and therefore advocate
its use as the dependent variable in the regression.  Following the theory developed in Douglas
and Wall (1993) and Douglas (1997), we argue that the numerator of this regressand should be
the net flow of migrants between the two regions, while its denominator should be the product of
their populations.
Finally, using the cross-migration specification on data for Canadian interprovincial
migration from 1976 to 1995, we estimate amenity levels and compensating differentials for
Canadian provinces in four five-year periods, separately for each of four age groups.  These
results generally accord well with common sense and expectations.  We also use the model to
rank the amenities and the overall standard of living of the provinces, finding consistently high
living standards (SOL) in British Columbia, Alberta, and Nova Scotia, while the highest
consistent amenity (QOL) levels are observed in the maritime provinces.12
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Table 1a:  Regression Coefficients ( g l ˆ , ˆ ), Relative Income (RY = ln(Y - Y
-
)),
  and Compensating Differential (RY* = ln(Y* - Y
-
))
Age 18-24 Age 25-44
Coeff t RY RY* Std Coeff t RY RY* Std
1976-80 l ˆ
ALB 0.101 5.18 15.1% -20.5% 7.6% 0.016 3.41 15.1% -12.7% 5.8%
BC -0.069 -2.90 20.0% 13.9% 2.7% -0.010 -1.72 20.0% 7.8% 3.3%
MAN -0.041 -3.65 -0.9% 8.3% 2.7% -0.023 -8.40 -0.9% 18.0% 3.8%
NB 0.057 2.74 -19.5% -11.5% 2.6% 0.012 2.47 -19.5% -9.7% 2.6%
NFLD 0.070 2.64 -26.2% -14.1% 3.1% 0.020 3.18 -26.2% -15.9% 2.7%
NS 0.049 2.94 -14.2% -9.9% 2.3% 0.016 3.89 -14.2% -12.3% 2.1%
ONT -0.144 -5.24 24.1% 29.1% 2.4% -0.042 -6.32 24.1% 33.0% 2.5%
PEI 0.067 2.68 -24.4% -13.5% 2.9% 0.030 4.99 -24.4% -23.6% 2.1%
QUE -0.077 -4.53 11.4% 15.5% 2.3% -0.023 -5.57 11.4% 18.0% 2.3%
SASK -0.013 -1.16 -1.2% 2.6% 2.3% 0.003 1.14 -1.2% -2.4% 2.2%
1981-85 l ˆ
ALB -0.096 -4.13 19.5% 19.4% 2.3% -0.037 -6.60 19.5% 29.1% 2.6%
BC -0.084 -4.25 15.4% 17.1% 2.3% -0.021 -4.42 15.4% 16.7% 2.1%
MAN -0.021 -1.72 3.1% 4.2% 2.3% -0.005 -1.87 3.1% 4.3% 2.1%
NB 0.069 3.66 -16.8% -13.9% 2.3% 0.025 5.47 -16.8% -19.5% 2.3%
NFLD 0.115 3.93 -29.3% -23.3% 2.4% 0.028 3.93 -29.3% -21.9% 2.4%
NS 0.083 5.94 -10.0% -16.9% 2.8% 0.017 4.94 -10.0% -13.2% 2.3%
ONT -0.092 -3.89 20.0% 18.6% 2.3% -0.023 -3.98 20.0% 17.9% 2.2%
PEI 0.084 3.48 -23.3% -17.0% 2.5% 0.031 5.34 -23.3% -24.4% 2.2%
QUE -0.045 -3.28 6.4% 9.0% 2.3% -0.011 -3.50 6.4% 9.0% 2.2%
SASK -0.014 -1.17 1.1% 2.7% 2.3% -0.003 -0.93 1.1% 2.0% 2.1%
1986-90 l ˆ
ALB -0.022 -1.23 13.2% 4.4% 3.0% -0.017 -3.97 13.2% 13.4% 2.1%
BC -0.017 -0.98 12.4% 3.4% 3.0% -0.001 -0.28 12.4% 0.9% 3.1%
MAN -0.019 -1.71 0.5% 3.9% 2.3% -0.007 -2.65 0.5% 5.7% 2.3%
NB 0.061 3.69 -13.2% -12.3% 2.3% 0.018 4.49 -13.2% -14.0% 2.2%
NFLD 0.057 2.54 -20.4% -11.4% 2.8% 0.021 3.86 -20.4% -16.3% 2.2%
NS 0.067 5.31 -6.9% -13.6% 2.7% 0.013 4.24 -6.9% -10.2% 2.3%
ONT -0.080 -3.33 20.8% 16.1% 2.5% -0.024 -4.18 20.8% 19.0% 2.2%
PEI 0.032 1.82 -14.7% -6.5% 2.7% 0.017 4.10 -14.7% -13.7% 2.1%
QUE -0.037 -2.82 6.3% 7.6% 2.3% -0.009 -2.90 6.3% 7.3% 2.1%
SASK -0.042 -3.33 -6.5% 8.5% 3.6% -0.010 -3.36 -6.5% 8.0% 3.3%
1991-95 l ˆ
ALB 0.033 1.92 12.5% -6.6% 4.5% -0.012 -3.00 12.5% 9.7% 2.2%
BC 0.027 1.55 13.4% -5.5% 4.5% -0.004 -1.04 13.4% 3.5% 2.9%
MAN -0.021 -1.87 -1.0% 4.3% 2.5% -0.003 -1.27 -1.0% 2.7% 2.2%
NB 0.026 1.86 -9.5% -5.3% 2.4% 0.011 3.11 -9.5% -8.4% 2.1%
NFLD -0.053 -2.66 -17.6% 10.7% 5.9% 0.007 1.52 -17.6% -5.8% 3.0%
NS 0.052 4.22 -5.5% -10.4% 2.5% 0.005 1.57 -5.5% -3.7% 2.2%
ONT -0.077 -3.67 17.7% 15.6% 2.3% -0.025 -4.87 17.7% 19.5% 2.2%
PEI 0.044 3.06 -10.0% -9.0% 2.3% 0.022 6.37 -10.0% -17.6% 2.6%
QUE -0.021 -1.80 3.0% 4.3% 2.3% -0.005 -1.91 3.0% 4.3% 2.1%
SASK -0.010 -0.70 -9.2% 2.0% 3.1% 0.005 1.61 -9.2% -4.3% 2.3%
Income g ˆ 0.495 5.09 0.128 5.41
R2 0.356 2 R 0.329 R2 0.333 2 R 0.30514
Table 1b:  Regression Coefficients ( g l ˆ , ˆ ), Relative Income (RY = ln(Y - Y
-
)),
  and Compensating Differential (RY* = ln(Y* - Y
-
))
Age 45-64 Age 65+
Coeff t RY RY* Std Coeff t RY RY* Std
1976-80 l ˆ
ALB -0.001 -0.238 15.1% 1.6% 6.5% 0.003 0.43 15.1% 49.5% 199%
BC 0.009 1.967 20.0% -16.5% 13.6% 0.036 3.94 20.0% 546.6% 2981%
MAN -0.010 -4.611 -0.9% 18.4% 7.2% -0.003 -0.61 -0.9% -40.1% 241%
NB 0.008 2.052 -19.5% -15.0% 4.1% 0.009 1.13 -19.5% 136.7% 879%
NFLD 0.004 0.729 -26.2% -6.8% 7.3% -0.019 -1.86 -26.2% -286.4% 1487%
NS 0.011 3.497 -14.2% -20.6% 4.8% 0.022 3.54 -14.2% 344.9% 2030%
ONT -0.019 -3.544 24.1% 34.3% 4.9% 0.010 0.94 24.1% 150.8% 713%
PEI 0.016 3.370 -24.4% -29.6% 4.6% -0.026 -2.71 -24.4% -394.5% 2110%
QUE -0.014 -4.383 11.4% 26.2% 6.0% -0.013 -1.98 11.4% -195.5% 1185%
SASK -0.004 -1.985 -1.2% 7.9% 4.7% -0.020 -4.74 -1.2% -312.0% 1774%
1981-85 l ˆ
ALB -0.016 -3.506 19.5% 28.7% 4.8% 0.008 0.93 19.5% 126.1% 601%
BC 0.000 -0.107 15.4% 0.8% 6.8% 0.014 1.88 15.4% 218.1% 1144%
MAN -0.005 -2.099 3.1% 8.9% 4.3% -0.001 -0.12 3.1% -8.1% 97%
NB 0.008 2.300 -16.8% -15.2% 4.0% 0.005 0.74 -16.8% 81.1% 552%
NFLD 0.008 1.437 -29.3% -14.9% 6.0% -0.019 -1.69 -29.3% -289.8% 1488%
NS 0.014 5.032 -10.0% -24.9% 6.9% 0.008 1.53 -10.0% 125.1% 762%
ONT -0.012 -2.658 20.0% 22.2% 4.0% 0.005 0.59 20.0% 81.5% 347%
PEI 0.013 2.842 -23.3% -24.1% 4.0% -0.006 -0.63 -23.3% -88.5% 384%
QUE -0.007 -2.774 6.4% 13.3% 4.4% -0.005 -0.98 6.4% -78.0% 491%
SASK -0.003 -1.300 1.1% 5.3% 4.1% -0.011 -2.49 1.1% -167.5% 967%
1986-90 l ˆ
ALB -0.010 -2.761 13.2% 17.3% 4.1% 0.013 1.95 13.2% 202.0% 1069%
BC 0.013 3.805 12.4% -23.0% 13.0% 0.016 2.48 12.4% 247.8% 1332%
MAN -0.008 -3.696 0.5% 14.8% 6.1% -0.007 -1.69 0.5% -112.0% 647%
NB 0.007 2.248 -13.2% -13.0% 4.0% 0.000 0.02 -13.2% 1.6% 103%
NFLD 0.003 0.644 -20.4% -5.1% 6.4% -0.011 -1.30 -20.4% -169.5% 852%
NS 0.009 3.451 -6.9% -15.5% 5.1% 0.005 0.98 -6.9% 72.6% 451%
ONT -0.014 -3.109 20.8% 26.2% 4.3% 0.000 -0.05 20.8% -7.1% 176%
PEI 0.012 3.615 -14.7% -22.4% 4.9% -0.001 -0.09 -14.7% -9.0% 72%
QUE -0.006 -2.143 6.3% 10.0% 4.1% -0.002 -0.48 6.3% -37.1% 260%
SASK -0.006 -2.410 -6.5% 10.7% 6.9% -0.012 -2.59 -6.5% -189.3% 1044%
1991-95 l ˆ
ALB -0.006 -1.844 12.5% 11.1% 4.0% 0.015 2.27 12.5% 225.6% 1208%
BC 0.003 0.913 13.4% -5.7% 7.8% 0.005 0.81 13.4% 83.6% 400%
MAN -0.005 -2.253 -1.0% 9.0% 5.1% -0.005 -1.12 -1.0% -74.0% 423%
NB 0.004 1.319 -9.5% -6.6% 4.1% -0.001 -0.27 -9.5% -22.2% 100%
NFLD 0.000 0.054 -17.6% -0.4% 6.9% -0.005 -0.69 -17.6% -80.0% 364%
NS 0.004 1.773 -5.5% -7.7% 4.1% 0.002 0.49 -5.5% 35.3% 238%
ONT -0.014 -3.526 17.7% 26.2% 4.8% 0.000 0.02 17.7% 2.5% 111%
PEI 0.019 6.569 -10.0% -33.6% 9.2% 0.001 0.11 -10.0% 9.7% 127%
QUE -0.004 -1.644 3.0% 6.9% 4.1% -0.002 -0.50 3.0% -34.2% 225%
SASK 0.000 -0.180 -9.2% 0.9% 5.1% -0.010 -1.79 -9.2% -146.4% 785%
Income g ˆ 0.055 2.917 -0.007 -0.18
R2 0.276 2 R 0.245 R2 0.149 2 R 0.11415
Table 2:  Sample Correlations among RY, RY*
Year\Age 18-24 25-44 45-64 65+
1976-80 .690 .745 .631 .447
1981-85 .979 .975 .868 .590
1986-90 .803 .876 .544 .542
1991-95 .128 .853 .584 .606
Table 3: Actual Differential (RY) vs.
Compensating Differential (RY*)
(Number of Provinces with the specified outcome of t-test
on H0:RY=RY*, a =.05, 2-tailed.)
Reject in favor of Accept
RY>RY* RY < RY* RY = RY*
1976-80
Age 18-24 2 5 3
25-44 2 5 3
45-64 2 4 4
1981-85
Age 18-24 1 2 7
25-44 0 2 8
45-64 2 1 7
1986-90
Age 18-24 3 3 4
25-44 1 2 7
45-64 1 3 6
1991-95
Age 18-24 2 3 5
25-44 2 2 6
45-64 2 2 616
Table 4: Relationship Among Actual Income (Y), National Average Income (Y -),
Amenities (l ˆ ), and Equilibrium Income (Y*)
Outcome of 2-tailed t-test on the null hypothesis that the expression equals zero.  Significance level is  =.05.
 ( “1” means reject in favor of >0; “-1” reject in favor of <0; “0”means  do not reject .)
AGE 18-24 25-44 45-64 65+ 18-24 25-44 45-64 65+
H0:Y - Y
-
l ˆ Y-Y* l ˆ Y-Y* l ˆ Y-Y* l ˆ Y-Y* Y-Y
-
l ˆ Y-Y* l ˆ Y-Y* l ˆ Y-Y* l ˆ Y-Y*
1976-80 1981-85
ALB 111 1 1 0 1 0 0 1- 10 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 ALB
BC 1- 11 0 1 1 1 1 0 1- 10 -1 0 0 1 0 0 BC
MAN -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 100 0 0 -1 0 0 0 MAN
NB -1 1 -1 1 -1 1 0 0 0 -1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 NB
NFLD -1 1 -1 1 -1 0 -1 0 0 -1 1 -1 1 -1 0 -1 0 0 NFLD
NS -1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 -1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 NS
ONT 1- 1-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 1- 10 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 ONT
PEI -1 1 -1 1 0 1 0 -1 0 -1 1 -1 1 0 1 0 0 0 PEI
QUE 1- 10 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 1- 10 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 QUE
SASK -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 0 100 0 0 0 0 -1 0 SASK
1986-90 1991-95
ALB 101 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 101 -1 0 0 0 1 0 ALB
BC 101 0 1 1 1 1 0 101 0 1 0 1 0 0 BC
MAN 100 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 -1 0 -1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 MAN
NB -1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 -1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 NB
NFLD -1 1 -1 1 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 -1 -1 0 -1 0 -1 0 0 NFLD
NS -1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NS
ONT 1- 10 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 1- 10 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 ONT
PEI -1 0 -1 1 0 1 0 0 0 -1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 PEI
QUE 1- 10 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 QUE
SASK -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 -1 0 -1 0 -1 0 -1 0 0 SASK17
Table 5: Ranking by Amenity Value (QOL, l ^)
Age 18-24 25-44 45-64 65+ Age 18-24 25-44 45-64 65+
1976-80 1981-85
ALB 1 3 6 5 ALB 10 10 10 2
BC 8 7 3 1 BC 8 8 5 1
M A N 798 6M A N 667 6
NB 4 5 4 4 NB 4 3 3 5
NFLD 2 2 5 8 NFLD 1 2 4 10
NS 5 4 2 2 NS 3 4 1 3
ONT 10 10 10 3 ONT 9 9 9 4
P E I 311 1 0 P E I 212 8
QUE 9 8 9 7 QUE 7 7 8 7
SASK 6 6 7 9 SASK 5 5 6 9
1986-90 1991-95
A L B 799 2A L B 399 1
BC 5 5 1 1 BC 4 7 4 2
M A N 668 8M A N 768 8
NB 2 2 4 4 NB 5 2 3 6
NFLD 3 1 5 9 NFLD 9 3 5 9
NS 1 4 3 3 NS 1 5 2 3
ONT 10 10 10 5 ONT 10 10 10 5
P E I 432 6P E I 211 4
QUE 8 7 6 7 QUE 8 8 7 7
SASK 9 8 7 10 SASK 6 4 6 1018
Table 6: Ranking by Overall Standard of Living (SOL = l ^ + g ^RY)
Age 18-24 25-44 45-64 65+ Age 18-24 25-44 45-64 65+
1976-80 1981-85
A L B 1 1 25A L B 31 093
BC 2 2 1 1 BC 6 7 2 1
MAN 8 10 9 6 MAN 4 6 7 6
NB 7 8 5 3 NB 8 2 4 4
NFLD 10 9 10 8 NFLD 9 9 10 10
NS 5 5 3 2 NS 1 1 1 2
ONT 6 7 7 4 ONT 2 3 5 5
PEI 9 4 4 10 PEI 10 4 3 7
QUE 4 6 8 7 QUE 7 8 8 8
SASK 3 3 6 9 SASK 5 5 6 9
1986-90 1991-95
A L B 256 2A L B 134 1
BC 1 1 1 1 BC 2 1 2 2
M A N 798 8M A N 888 9
NB 5 4 4 4 NB 7 4 5 5
NFLD 9 8 9 9 NFLD 10 10 10 8
NS 3 2 2 3 NS 3 7 3 3
ONT 4 3 7 6 ONT 4 6 7 6
P E I 873 5P E I 521 4
QUE 6 6 5 7 QUE 6 5 6 7
SASK 10 10 10 10 SASK 9 9 9 10